Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law
Journal
Volume 18 Volume XVIII
Number 4 Volume XVIII Book 4

Article 4

2008

The Olympic Binding Arbitration Clause and the Court of
Arbitration for Sport: An Analysis of Due Process Concerns
Jason Gubi
Fordham University

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj
Part of the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law
Commons

Recommended Citation
Jason Gubi, The Olympic Binding Arbitration Clause and the Court of Arbitration for Sport: An Analysis of
Due Process Concerns, 18 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 997 (2008).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol18/iss4/4

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal
by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information,
please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

The Olympic Binding Arbitration Clause and the Court of Arbitration for Sport: An
Analysis of Due Process Concerns
Cover Page Footnote
Proffessor Victor Essien, Bryan Lipski, Andrew Glickman

This note is available in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal:
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol18/iss4/4

04_GUBI_031208_FINAL

3/12/2008 7:12:45 PM

The Olympic Binding Arbitration
Clause and the Court of Arbitration for
Sport: An Analysis of Due Process
Concerns
Jason Gubi*
INTRODUCTION
International sports law is guided both by national policies and
those of international non-governmental organizations, such as the
Olympic movement.1 When disputes arise, there is a need to find
an equitable resolution. Because litigation can be time-consuming
and often unsatisfying due to conflicting national laws, there has
been a growing reliance on alternative methods of dispute
resolution within the field of international sports.2

A PDF version of this article is available online at http://law.fordham.edu/publications/
article.ihtml?pubID=200&id=2761. Visit http://www.iplj.net for access to the complete
Journal archive.
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1
James A.R. Nafziger, International Sports Law: A Replay of Characteristics and
Trends, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 489, 490–91 [hereinafter Nafziger, Characteristics and
Trends].
2
See generally id.
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Similarly, alternative methods of dispute resolution such as
mediation and arbitration have become increasingly important
forms of dispute resolution for sports-related issues in the United
States.3 The Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act of
1978, which requires America’s national governing bodies of
various sports to submit disputes within the scope of the act to the
American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) for review, has acted
as a catalyst promoting movement in this direction.4 In passing the
Act, Congress must have believed that procedural safeguards
would still protect the due process rights of litigants. Otherwise,
the Act itself could arguably be said to be in violation of the due
process protections embodied in the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.5 Thus, there is not a hotly contested constitutional
issue involved when arbitration occurs in the United States
between United States bodies since American arbitration bodies
must still provide due process protections.6
However, in order to compete in the Olympics, the
International Olympic Committee (“IOC”) since 1996 has required
all potential competitors to sign a waiver form agreeing to litigate
all claims in front of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (“CAS”),
and forego lawsuits.7 The CAS was created by the IOC in 1983,
but was criticized for not being independent of the IOC; the IOC
chose members of the CAS, which was financially and legally an
arm of the IOC.8 In response to these criticisms by the Swiss
Supreme Court, the IOC founded the International Council of
Arbitration for Sport (“ICAS”) in 1994 to administer the CAS.9
3
Anthony T. Polvino, Arbitration as Preventative Medicine for Olympic Ailments:
The International Olympic Committee’s Court of Arbitration for Sport and the Future for
the Settlement of International Sporting Disputes, 8 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 347, 349.
4
James A.R. Nafziger, Arbitration of Rights and Obligations in the International
Sports Arena, 35 VAL. U. L. REV. 357, 358–59 [hereinafter Nafziger, Arbitration of
Rights and Obligations].
5
See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1; see also Urvasi Naidoo & Neil Sarin, Dispute
Resolution at Games Time, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 489, 495–96
(2002)
6
See Naidoo & Sarin, supra note 5, at 506.
7
Nancy K. Raber, Dispute Resolution in Olympic Sport: The Court of Arbitration for
Sport, 8 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 75, 77 (1998).
8
See Naidoo & Sarin, supra note 5, at 502.
9
Id.
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The ICAS’s role is to protect the arbitration process and financial
independence of the CAS by overseeing all administrative and
financial aspects of the court.10 The ICAS is incorporated as a
non-profit, non-governmental organization in Switzerland, and is
thus governed by Swiss law.11 Swiss law also, therefore, governs
the CAS.
The due process rights of American competitors in the highly
contentious field of Olympic sport are thus only as secure as the
Swiss judicial system ensures. This paper will discuss problems
with this requirement stemming from due process protections
provided in the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments. Part II of this
paper will set a backdrop for this discussion by summarizing the
international Olympic structure, relevant United States arbitration
law, and the structure of the CAS. Part III will discuss the
Olympic binding arbitration clause, including the due process
issues raised by both the Olympic binding arbitration clause and
the CAS. Finally, Part IV will make suggestions that could ensure
that these due process concerns are addressed.
I. OLYMPIC DISPUTE RESOLUTION STRUCTURE:
Americans live and work abroad. Foreigners live and work in
the United States. Nothing about this equation is new, nor is it
new in the case of sports. The modern incarnation of the Olympic
Games is based on the ancient Olympics, which pitted competitors
from differing city-states and across the Roman Empire against
one another.12 It was an international sports competition. Today,
however, sports are a much more important economic activity.13
American Olympians are often full-time, paid athletes.14 Besides
the nominal salary of Olympic athletes, the endorsement
opportunities available to successful Olympians further raises the
10

See id.
See id.
12
See Raber, supra note 7, at 79.
13
Cf. James A.R. Nafziger, The Future of International Sports Law, 42 WILLAMETTE L.
REV. 861, 871–72 (2006) (noting that corporate influence in international sports
competitions has expanded) [hereinafter Nafziger, Future of International Sports Law].
14
Melissa R. Bitting, Mandatory, Binding Arbitration for Olympic Athletes: Is the
Process Better or Worse for “Job Security”?, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 655, 665–67 (1998).
11
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monetary stakes involved.15 This increased monetary aspect has,
in turn, increased the likelihood for conflict among potential
competitors for the right to compete.
The International Olympic Movement governs the Olympics.16
However, since the Olympic Movement is a collective network of
non-governmental entities, its rulings are not binding on states as a
matter of international law.17 Rather, a desire to have a state’s
athletes be eligible to compete in the Olympics has largely driven
conformity with the guidelines of the International Olympic
Movement. This conformity can, in some instances, be said to
have created customary international law, which is binding on
states regardless of their participation in the Olympic Games.18
This paper will discuss whether the Court of Arbitration for Sport
has adequate due process protections to conform to American
notions of justice. Part II will discuss United States arbitration law
related to international sports matters and the CAS after
summarizing the structure of the International Olympic Movement.
A. International Olympic Structure
International sports law, like other types of international law is
governed primarily by provisions of international conventions,
international custom, and to a lesser extent, the general principles
of law recognized by civilized nations, case law, and the teachings
of the most qualified international sports law theorists.19 The
Olympic Movement, governed by the IOC, is “the dominant
institution in the framework of international sports law” because it
serves as a catalyst for the development of international sports law
as its rules and practices develop into customary international
law.20

15

See Nafziger, Future of International Sports Law, supra note 13, at 866–67.
See Nafziger, Characteristics and Trends, supra note 1, at 490–91.
17
See id. at 491–93.
18
See generally CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 486–91 (2d ed. 2006).
19
See Polvino, supra note 3, at 349; see also Statute of the International Court of
Justice, at art. 38.
20
See Polvino, supra note 3, at 350.
16
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The Olympic Movement is composed of the IOC, International
Sports Federations (“ISF’s”), National Olympic Committees
(“NOC’s”), organizing committees for particular Olympic Games,
and the Olympic Congress.21 Along with local and national
governments, these institutions govern international sports
competitions.22 Unfortunately, the rules and regulations of these
institutions do not always correlate with one another. Even when
the rules and regulations do correlate, the way a particular case
would be interpreted by these differing bodies may not coincide.
Thus, an athlete may be found to have complied with regulations
by one body, but still be banned from competition by another.23 In
this subsection, I will discuss these overlapping levels of
regulation, beginning with the IOC.
1. IOC Structure
The IOC has been referred to as the “point person” of the
Olympic Movement, and is responsible for the development and
regulation of high-performance sports competitions.24
The
Committee acts as a coordinating body, delegating the conduction
of international competitions and world championships to ISFs and
NOCs.25
Perhaps the IOC’s most important function is the role it plays
in setting international sports law. The IOC, as indicated by its
founding documents, is a non-governmental organization and thus
has no power to create international law.26 The main way that the
Olympic Movement develops international law is by states
following the practices set forth by the IOC.27 In general, states
21

See id. at 350–51.
Id.
23
James A.R. Nafziger, American Law in a Time of Global Interdependence: U.S.
Nation Reports to the XVIth International Congress of Comparative Law: Section II
Dispute Resolution in the Arena of International Sports Competition, 50 AM. J. COMP. L.
161, 162 (2002) [hereinafter Nafziger, Global Interdependence].
24
Susan Haslip, International Sports Law Perspective: A Consideration of the Need for
a National Dispute Resolution System for National Sport Organizations in Canada, 11
MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 245, 257 (2001)
25
Id.
26
See Polvino, supra note 3, at 351.
27
See id.
22
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have voluntarily followed the rules, decisions, and practices of the
IOC and the Olympic Charter, often incorporating them into their
respective national sports law policies.28
The IOC provides a basic framework that ISFs have to follow
in order for a particular sport to be conducted in the Olympics.29
While a particular ISF may be the official federation for more than
one Olympic sport, the IOC only recognizes one ISF for a
particular sport.30 This Federation, in turn, coordinates with the
NOCs of nations across the world.31 Every nation participating in
the Olympics has a national sports federation (NSF) or governing
body32 for the sports it competes in, which ensures that a given
sport is being run according to the standards set by its respective
ISF.33
2. Role of the ISFs
There are a total of thirty-five ISFs.34 These ISFs serve three
primary functions. First, the IOC delegates the authority to run
international competitions to the various ISFs.35 The second main
function of the ISFs is in spreading the ideals, practices, and rules
of the IOC. In order for an athlete to compete in an Olympic
Games, he must both be selected by his nation’s NOC and also be
in conformance with the rules of the ISF for which he is
competing.36 The statutes, practices, and activities of the ISFs
must, in turn, conform to the Olympic Charter.37 Third, in addition
to these general rules all ISFs export to the respective NOCs and
National Governing Bodies (‘NGB’s), each ISF determines the
28

See id. at 351–52.
See Raber, supra note 7, at 82.
30
Cf. International Olympic Committee, http://www.olympic.org/uk/organization/if/
index_uk.asp (last visited Feb. 1, 2008) (noting that international federations are
recognized by the IOC as administering one or more sports at world level).
31
See Raber, supra note 7, at 82.
32
Hereinafter, national sports associations responsible for administering competitions
to determine who will represent a particular state in an international competition will be
referred to by their alternate name, National Governing Bodies.
33
See Raber, supra note 7, at 82.
34
See Naidoo & Sarin, supra note 5, at 489.
35
See Haslip, supra note 24, at 257.
36
See Naidoo & Sarin, supra note 5, at 492.
37
Id.
29
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rules by which that sport is to be judged, thereby bringing about
conformity in how sports are conducted throughout the world.38
3. Authority and Role of NOCs and NGBs
NOCs are responsible for determining who will represent a
particular nation in an international sports competition. Typically,
NOCs delegate to their respective NGBs the authority to hold
competitions in order to determine who will represent the nation in
international competitions.39 NGBs incorporate the rules for a
particular sport as determined by ISFs thereby helping the spread
of ISF rules to the local level.40 In this way, conformity with
international practice is achieved and the ideals of the IOC are
spread as NGBs conform to the dictates of ISFs, who themselves
are embodying the principles and practices of the IOC.41 The
United States Olympic Committee (“USOC”) is America’s NOC.42
The USOC is responsible for supporting American athletes in
general, and specifically, American Olympic athletes.43 Though
operating under various names, the USOC, has represented the
United States in all Olympic matters since its founding in 1894.44
It selects and enters American competitors for participation in the
Summer and Winter Olympic Games, the Pan American Games,
and the Paralympic Games.45
The Amateur Sports Act creates the authority for the USOC to
46
Section 220503 addresses the purposes of the USOC.47
act.
Some of these purposes are:
38
See Mary K. Fitzgerald, The Court of Arbitration for Sport: Doping and Due Process
During the Olympics, 7 SPORTS LAW. J. 213, 215 (2000).
39
See Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act, 36 U.S.C.A. § 220523 (1998)
[hereinafter Amateur Sports Act] (delegating the authority to hold competitions in order
to determine who will represent the United States in international competitions to
National Governing Bodies).
40
See Fitzgerald, supra note 38, at 215.
41
See Naidoo & Sarin, supra note 5, at 492.
42
See United States Olympic Committee Charter § 1.4 (2006) [hereinafter USOC
Charter], available at http://www.usoc.org/USOC_Bylaws_as_of_6232006.pdf.
43
Id. § 2.1.
44
Christopher T. Murray, Representant Les Etats-Unis D’Amerique: Reforming the
USOC Charter, 7 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 233, 235 (2005).
45
See USOC Charter § 1.4.
46
See Murray, supra note 44, at 233.
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to establish national goals for amateur athletic
activities and encourage the[ir] attainment . . .;



to coordinate and develop amateur athletic
activity in the United States, directly related to
international amateur athletic competition, to
foster productive working relationships among
sports-related organizations;
to promote and support amateur athletic
activities involving the United States and
foreign nations;





[Vol. 18

to assist organizations and persons concerned
with sports in the development of amateur
athletic programs for amateur athletes;48
Thus, the USOC has been empowered by Congress to act as the
body primarily responsible for American involvement in
international amateur athletic activities, as well as to coordinate
America’s domestic efforts in the field of amateur athletic activity.
Section 220505 of the code describes the powers created by the
Amateur Sports Act to be held by the USOC.49 Part (c)(4) of the
section creates the power for the USOC to recognize NGBs.50
Sections 220521 through § 220528 deal with NGBs.51
Section 220521 of the Amateur Sports Act provides for the
general recognition authority by the USOC of NGBs.52 Section
220522 provides eligibility requirements for NGBs to receive and
retain such recognition by the USOC.53 Since American NGBs
receive their authority from the USOC, they must conform to
regulations set forth by the USOC. However, in order to be an
official representative of a nation with an ISF, NGBs must also
conform to the dictates of that ISF. There is thus a dual level of
regulation to which NGBs must conform in order for the athletes
47
48
49
50
51
52
53

See Amateur Sports Act, 36 U.S.C.A. § 220523 (1998).
Id.
Id. § 220505.
Id. § 220505(c)(4).
Id. §§ 220521–28.
Id. § 220521.
Id. § 220522.
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served by a particular NGB to be eligible to compete in
international competition.
Section 220523 establishes the power that NGBs receive upon
recognition as a NGB by the USOC.54 NGBs represent the United
States in ISFs; select teams for international competitions other
than the Olympics, Paralympic Games, and the Pan-American
Games and make recommendations to the USOC as to who should
represent the United States for these competitions; and coordinate
and conduct amateur athletic activities in the United States.55 For
an amateur athletic association to hold a competition, it must
receive a sanction to do so by its NGB.56 The title ‘national
governing body’ is thus apt because NGBs coordinate all amateur
athletic activity for a particular sport in the country.
Through this overlapping structure of authority, amateur
athletes across the globe from the remotest villages to the largest
cities are subject to the same rules and regulations for a particular
sport as well as the ideals of the IOC. Because international
athletic competition has become such a large business enterprise,
there has been an increasing level of disputes in recent years.57
When disputes arise in the United States in consideration of
amateur athletic competition, there is a strong preference in the law
for such conflicts to be resolved outside of the courts.58 As Judge
Posner once said, “there can be few less suitable bodies than the
federal courts for determining the eligibility, or procedures for
determining the eligibility, of athletes to participate in the Olympic
Games.”59 I will next discuss United States arbitration law that is
particularly related to amateur athletic competition because
arbitration is an alternative to litigation.

54

Id. § 220523.
Id.
56
Id. § 220525.
57
Cf. Nafziger, Future of International Sports Law, supra note 13, at 872 (noting that
“corporate intervention in the sports arena generates conflicts”).
58
See Nafziger, Arbitration of Rights and Obligations, supra note 4, at 358–59.
59
Michels v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 741 F.2d 155, 159 (Ill. 1984).
55
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B. United States Arbitration Law
Litigation can be expensive and time-consuming. In the
context of determining who will represent a nation in an
international sports competition, the time that a lawsuit can take
will often conflict with the need for a quick resolution of the
dispute in order for a NOC to submit a list of competitors for a
particular event.60 Binding arbitration presents an opportunity to
more quickly resolve such disputes.61 The Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, the
Federal Arbitration Act, and the Ted Stevens Olympic and
Amateur Sports Act are important aspects of United States
arbitration law as it relates to international sports competition.
1. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards
The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards is an international convention requiring
signatory states to enforce the arbitration judgments of other
states.62 A member state is bound under the Convention to
recognize arbitration rulings from other states regardless of
whether the state in which the arbitration hearing occurred adheres
to the Convention.63 A few exceptions to this enforcement
requirement exist. Under Article V of the Convention, an
arbitration ruling does not have to be enforced if doing so would be
against the public policy of a given state.64 Rulings also do not
have to be enforced if the arbitration panel acted against its own
stated rules or there is reason to believe one of the arbitrators may
have been biased based on his actions or his failure to disclose a
potential conflict of interest.65 Finally, courts do not have to

60

See Bitting, supra note 14, at 660.
See id. at 662–64.
62
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June
10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S 38 [hereinafter New York Convention].
63
See id. art. I.
64
See id. art. V(2)(b); see also Naidoo & Sarin, supra note 5, at 494.
65
See New York Convention, supra note 62, art. V(1)(a) & (d); see also Naidoo &
Sarin, supra note 5, at 494.
61
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enforce foreign arbitration rulings when the court system where the
arbitration was held has vacated the judgment.66
In order to be a member of a United States NGB, and thereby
eligible to be selected to represent the United States in
international competition, one must agree to arbitration as per the
provisions of the Amateur Sports Act.67 Once selected to compete,
all Olympic athletes must sign a form agreeing to submit all
disputes to the CAS.68 Since the court is incorporated in
Switzerland, the CAS applies Swiss law by default.69 Because the
CAS is a foreign arbitration body, the New York Convention
makes rulings of the CAS binding on American courts unless one
of the previously stated exceptions to enforcement can be invoked.
Therefore, one who is challenging an IOC determination
concerning his eligibility to compete in the Olympic Games is
bound by CAS determinations without a right of appeal because
the New York Convention compels enforcement of CAS rulings by
United States courts. The United States Arbitration Act of 1925,
commonly known as the Federal Arbitration Act, works in
conjunction with the New York Convention to see that foreign
arbitration awards are enforced in United States jurisdictions.70
2. Federal Arbitration Act
The United States Arbitration Act of 1925 (“FAA”) provides
for the specific enforcement of arbitration agreements.71 Section 2
of the FAA limits the scope of the New York Convention as
applied in the United States by stating that an arbitration agreement
is valid “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.”72 Since American contract law is a
creature of state law, grounds for revocation of any contractual
66

See New York Convention, supra note 62, art. V(1)(e); see also Naidoo & Sarin,
supra note 5, at 494.
67
See Amateur Sports Act, 36 U.S.C. § 220522 (2006).
68
See Naidoo & Sarin, supra note 5, at 493; see also Fitzgerald, supra note 38, at 238.
69
See Fitzgerald, supra note 38, at 237.
70
See United States Arbitration Act of 1925, 9 U.S.C. §§ 2–3 (1925) [hereinafter
FAA]; see also New York Convention, supra note 62, arts. I, III.
71
See generally FAA, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16; see also, Richard Bales & Jason F. Darnall,
Arbitral Discovery of Non-Parties, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 321, 321 (2001).
72
See FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 2.
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provision stem from state law sources.73 This provision is similar
to the aforementioned provision limiting the scope of the New
York Convention that states are not bound to recognize arbitration
decisions that are adverse to the public policy of that state.
The objective of the New York Convention should not
therefore be viewed as achieving full recognition of every foreign
arbitration decision, but rather, as both prohibiting states from
taking affirmative steps to prevent foreign recognition and also
promoting a more stable system for arbitration in the international
context. In addition to the New York Convention and the FAA,
the Amateur Sports Act also has a substantial effect on the way
sports disputes are resolved.
3. Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act
The Amateur Sports Act was updated in 1998 for a number of
reasons, including the desire to protect the USOC against lawsuits
for situations in which an athlete’s right to participate in the
Olympic Games is at stake.74 The Amateur Sports Act establishes
the authority for the USOC to act as America’s representative for
international amateur sports competitions.75 It also sets up the
hierarchical system whereby NGBs coordinate amateur athletic
activity for particular sports and act as the liaison with ISFs.76 In
addition to these primary functions, the Amateur Sports Act also
compels the use of arbitration to resolve disputes between NGBs
and the USOC, as well as between amateur athletes and their
respective NGBs.77
Section 220503 of the Amateur Sports Act lists providing
“swift resolution of conflicts and disputes involving amateur
athletes, national governing bodies, and amateur sports
organizations” and protecting “the opportunity of any amateur
73

See JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 1.6 (5th ed. 2003).
For discussion on whether the Olympic binding arbitration may be voided by American
courts because it violates common law contractual doctrines, see Naidoo and Sarin, supra
note 5, at 503–05.
74
See Murray, supra note 46, at 233.
75
See generally Amateur Sports Act, 36 U.S.C. §§ 220503, 220505 (2006).
76
See generally id. §§ 220505, 220521–28.
77
See generally id. §§ 220522, 220527, 220529.
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athlete . . . to participate in amateur athletic competition” as two of
the purposes of the USOC.78 However, this mandate of § 220503
seems to be contradicted by the prohibition of lawsuits provided in
§ 220509 of the Act.
Subsection (a) of § 220509 of the Amateur Sports Act prevents
a prospective athlete hoping to represent the United States in
international competition from bringing a lawsuit within twentyone days of the beginning of such competition.79 In order for
subsection (a) to be invoked, the USOC must certify to a court
where a lawsuit is brought that it cannot provide for the resolution
of such dispute prior to the beginning of such competition.80
Unfortunately for the athlete who feels his opportunity to compete
has been unfairly restricted, this is exactly the situation in which
such a prospective competitor would need injunctive protection
from a court. The USOC’s desire for timely resolution of
conflicts, so as to not interfere with the selection of competitors for
international competitions, is directly in conflict with prospective
competitors’ desire to uphold their rights when they feel their
exclusion is unjust. While binding arbitration may yield swift
resolution of disputes, it may not be the best way to protect the
opportunity of amateur athletes to compete for reasons that will be
discussed in Part III of this paper.
Section 220529 states that one who is aggrieved under §
220527 has the right to arbitration under the AAA.81 Section
220527 deals with a member’s complaint against his or her
respective NGB.82 If a member of a NGB believes his NGB has
violated a provision of §§ 220522, 220524, or 220525 of the
Amateur Sports Act, once NGB appeal mechanisms are exhausted,
he or she is entitled to a hearing before the USOC.83 An
unfavorable decision in this hearing can then be appealed to the
AAA as per § 220529.84
78
79
80
81
82
83
84

Id. § 220503.
Id. § 220509.
Id.
See id. §§ 220527, 220529.
See id. § 220527.
Id.
See id. § 220529.
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Under § 220522, in addition to other requirements, an amateur
sports organization can only be recognized as a NGB if it agrees to
binding arbitration for all disputes concerning the right of its
members to compete in international competition.85 The NGB
must not unfairly restrict membership and must also provide “an
equal opportunity to . . . participate in amateur athletic
competition, without discrimination . . . and with fair notice and
opportunity for a hearing . . . before declaring the individual
ineligible to participate.”86
Section 220524 addresses the duties of NGBs.87 Violation of
the obligation to inform amateurs of applicable rules and rule
changes in a timely manner, for example, is grounds for
challenging NGB recommendations regarding who should compete
in a particular international competition.88 Section 220525 deals
with NGBs holding international competitions in the United States;
more importantly, it deals with the sponsoring of athlete trips to
participate in international competitions outside of the United
States.89 Failure of a NGB to act in a timely manner in deciding
whether or not to grant the sanction for an athlete to compete can
have grave repercussions for an Olympic hopeful. As such, an
athlete can challenge his NGB’s decision of whether to grant the
sanction, or its failure to act in a timely manner in so deciding,
before the USOC.90
The Amateur Sports Act deals with the rights and obligations
of the USOC and NGBs, and creates a right to arbitration while in
some situations prohibiting lawsuits.91 This act can not, however,
be viewed in isolation. In combination with the New York
Convention and the FAA, the Amateur Sports Act both makes
decisions of the AAA binding and also prevents an aggrieved party
from bringing a lawsuit in the context of disputes arising
immediately before the onset of international competition.

85
86
87
88
89
90
91

See id. § 220522.
Id.
See id. § 220524.
Id.
See id. § 220525.
See id.
See generally id. §§ 220509, 220522, 220524–25, 220527–29.
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In order to be recognized as a NGB, an organization must agree
to binding arbitration when one of its members is challenging a
decision as to who the USOC is recognizing as the United States
representative in an international competition.92 After the IOC
created the requirement that all competitors agree to binding
arbitration before the CAS, the IOC persuaded all thirty-five ISFs
to agree to the IOC supported dispute resolution process,
effectively preventing any dissent by competitors from
materializing.93 The USOC is legislatively required to ensure that
the United States will be in compliance with the requirements of
bodies such as the IOC.94 Since the IOC requires athletes to agree
to binding arbitration, a failure by the USOC to promote such
acceptance may not be in keeping with its congressional mandate.
Thus, it could be argued that the Amateur Sports Act prohibition
against lawsuits in the period immediately preceding international
competition is merely a response to the Olympic requirement that
athletes consent to binding arbitration when challenging a decision
regarding their right to compete.
Analysis of the Olympic binding arbitration clause is thus
necessary. Two main questions presented by the Olympic binding
arbitration clause are whether American courts would strike the
provision for offending common law contract principles and
whether it violates constitutional due process protections.
Contractually, the provision may be attacked for (1) being a
contract of adhesion, or (2) one that was fostered by parties in
unequal bargaining position, because of the concepts of (3)
unconscionability and (4) duress, (5) the capacity of the parties, or
(6) for being an unlawful restraint of trade.95 While analysis of the
provision in the context of international athletic competition can
illuminate whether American courts would uphold the provision,
analysis of the structure of the CAS is needed to determine
whether it violates American due process protections.

92
93
94
95

70.

See id. § 220522.
See Naidoo & Sarin, supra note 5, at 495.
See Amateur Sports Act, 36 U.S.C. § 220503 (2006).
See Naidoo & Sarin, supra note 5, at 503–05; see also Bitting, supra note 14, at 667–
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C. The Court of Arbitration for Sport
CAS Secretary General Matthieu Reeb has pointed to two main
objectives leading to the creation of the court. First, at the
beginning of the 1980s, an increase in the number of international
sports-related disputes combined with the absence of an
independent authority with expertise and authority to handle such
matters led to the conclusion that some sort of authority with the
ability to set binding rulings was necessary.96 A second main
objective of the IOC in creating the CAS was to settle disputes
quickly and inexpensively.97
The IOC held these goals (a) because litigation can be both
costly and lengthy and (b) because it believed the efficient
resolution of disputes by a recognized binding authority to be
essential in order to further the objectives of the Olympic Games.98
However, without a mechanism for potential competitors to have a
meaningful venue to seek a redress of their grievances, spectator
faith in the fairness of the Games would likely wane. Thus the
court is charged with efficiently and fairly settling disputes both so
that competitors feel their rights are not being trampled, and also
so that a fair and accurate result is achieved.
1. History and Structure of the CAS
The history of the CAS can be divided into two periods: the
first dates from the inception of the court in 1983 until
amendments to its structure were made in 1994. Prior to these
changes made through the Agreement concerning the constitution
of the International Council of Arbitration for Sport (‘Paris
Agreement’), the court was a body of the IOC.99 The CAS was
composed of sixty members, with fifteen members apiece
appointed by the IOC, the ISFs, the NOCs, and the IOC President,
with the budget supplied by the IOC.100 The IOC, at the proposal

96
See Matthieu Reeb, The Court of Arbitration for Sport, http://www.tas-cas.org/en/
histoire/histoireA.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2008).
97
See id.
98
See Bitting, supra note 14, at 663–64.
99
See Reeb, supra note 96.
100
See id.
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of the IOC Executive Board, had the sole authority to amend the
statute governing CAS proceedings.101 Beginning in 1991, the
CAS published a guide to arbitration that included model
arbitration clauses. One such clause was for use by sports
federations.102 This clause led to the development of the CAS as a
body for parties to appeal the decisions made by the sports
federations to which they belonged.103
The International Equestrian Federation (“FEI”) was the first
sports federation to adopt the aforementioned arbitration clause.104
Elmar Gundel, one of its members, filed an appeal with the CAS,
challenging a decision by the FEI.105 Unsatisfied with the result
before the CAS, Gundel subsequently filed an appeal with the
Swiss Federal Tribunal challenging the court’s impartiality and
independence.106 Though the Swiss Federal Tribunal found that
the CAS was a true court of arbitration for purposes of the case
before it, its ruling indicated concern that the CAS may not be
sufficiently independent, and thus possibly not impartial, if the
IOC was one of the parties.107
As a result of these concerns, the structure of the CAS was
modified to make it independent of the IOC.108 In order to achieve
this end, the ICAS was created with the purpose of running and
funding the CAS.109 The number of CAS arbitrators was also
expanded with the power to appoint them given to the ICAS.110
Rather than have a set number of arbitrators selected by the IOC,
ISFs, NOCs, and the IOC President, all arbitrators are appointed by
the ICAS upon proposal by the IOC, ISFs, NOCs, and at its own
behest.111 One of the more important reforms was changing the
process whereby the CAS hears arbitration proceedings.
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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Before the Paris Agreement, the CAS did not draw a
distinction between arbitration cases brought in the first instance
between parties and those brought on appeal. Now there is a clear
distinction between the two main procedures of the CAS.112 This
distinction makes the court more likely to be used since potential
parties to a hearing now better understand the services provided.
In general, cases brought in the first instance deal with commercial
issues and those brought in the Appeals division pertain to
disciplinary matters.113 In addition, the Paris Agreement also
provided for the court to issue advisory positions, to conduct
mediation prior to arbitration proceeding, and for the creation of an
ad hoc division of the CAS that is operative during international
competitions to resolve disputes in a timely manner.114
The first ad hoc division was set up for the 1996 Olympic
Games in Atlanta.115 Since that time, ad hoc divisions have also
been created for subsequent Olympic Games, the European
Football Union Championships and the Commonwealth Games.116
A simpler procedure is used for the ad hoc division so that
arbitration proceedings can be brought and heard within twentyfour hours.117
2. Process Whereby Arbitration Hearings Are Brought Before
the CAS
Any aggrieved party can submit a dispute to the CAS if there is
an arbitration agreement between the parties indicating that either
or both of the parties has recourse to the court and the dispute is
related to sports.118 Specifically, the Statutes of the Bodies
Working for the Settlement of Sports-related Disputes (“Statutes”)
provides that the Statutes’ “procedural rules apply whenever the
112

See id.
See id.
114
See id.; see also Court of Arbitration for Sports, Code of Sports-related Arbitration,
Statutes of the Bodies Working for the Settlement of Sports-related Disputes § 6
[hereinafter Code of Sports-related Arbitration], available at http://www.tascas.org/en/code/frmco.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2008).
115
See Reeb, supra note 96.
116
See id.
117
See id.
118
See id.
113

04_GUBI_031208_FINAL

2008]

3/12/2008 7:12:45 PM

THE OLYMPIC BINDING ARBITRATION CLAUSE

1015

parties have agreed to refer a sports-related dispute to the CAS.”119
“Such disputes may arise out of an arbitration clause inserted in a
contract or regulations,” or of a subsequent arbitration agreement,
in the case of ordinary arbitration proceedings.120
For arbitration proceedings in appeal of matters decided by
other sports organizations, disputes may “involve an appeal against
a decision rendered by a federation, association or sports-related
body where the . . . regulations of such bodies, or a specific
agreement” between the “parties provides for an appeal to the
CAS.”121 All of these “disputes may involve matters of principle
relating to sport or matters of pecuniary or other interests brought
into play in the practice or the development of sport and . . . any
[other] activity related or connected to sport.”122 The court
generally views its jurisdiction broadly. Indeed, it has never
declined to exercise jurisdiction when a party has sought
arbitration before it.123
3. Appeal of CAS Rulings
A party to an arbitration proceeding who wants to appeal a
CAS ruling can only do so when the instrument providing for
arbitration does not contain a provision precluding such an
appeal.124 Also, such a party must be domiciled in Switzerland.125
If the ruling is not going to be carried out in Switzerland or by a
Swiss entity, the aforementioned provisions from the New York
Convention can lead a national court where that party is a citizen
(or if a corporation, is incorporated) to not enforce the ruling. 126
However, if the ruling were to be carried out in Switzerland or by
an institution incorporated in Switzerland, such as the IOC, this
would leave all non-Swiss parties in a worse position vis-a-vis
Swiss parties to arbitration hearings before the CAS.
119

See Code of Sports-related Arbitration, supra note 114, § 27.
Id.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
See Reeb, supra note 96.
124
Code of Sports-related Arbitration, supra note 114, §§ 46, 59.
125
Id.
126
See supra notes 64–66 and accompanying text (addressing when a party to the
Convention does not have to enforce foreign arbitration decisions).
120
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II. THE OLYMPIC BINDING ARBITRATION CLAUSE
The Olympic binding arbitration clause introduced for the 1996
Summer Olympics in Atlanta must be signed by all competitors in
order for the IOC to confirm their ability to compete.127 Moreover,
the IOC has attained the acquiescence of all the ISFs it recognizes
in embracing binding arbitration before the CAS by its
members.128
A. Positive Attributes of the Olympic Binding Arbitration Clause
The Olympic binding arbitration clause presents an efficient
mechanism for resolving disputes during the Olympic Games. The
ad hoc division set up at the respective Olympic Games has not
charged athletes appealing decisions concerning their ability to
compete.129 Moreover, most such cases have yielded a decision
within twenty-four hours.130 Thus the speed and cost of appealing
a ruling to the CAS were not hindrances for competitors seeking to
challenge adverse rulings. Additional positive attributes of the
CAS are that it is likely to be more neutral than arbitration by ISFs
and NGBs; the panel is composed of experts in sports law; CAS
proceedings can be flexible; and the court’s judgments are more
easily enforceable than those of national court systems.131 Also,
domestic courts may not have the jurisdiction to hear a case when
the other party is based in another country.132
Some attributes of the CAS have both positive and negative
aspects in comparison with traditional litigation.
While
confidentiality is generally viewed as a positive aspect of
arbitration, such confidentiality also yields more uncertainty for
parties, as they may not be aware of how the CAS has ruled in
similar cases previously.
Athletes may thus distrust CAS
proceedings for this reason if they fear that the CAS is
unpredictable and inconsistent.133
127
128
129
130
131
132
133

See Raber, supra note 7, at 77.
See Naidoo & Sarin, supra note 5, at 495.
See Reeb, supra note 96.
Id.
See Naidoo & Sarin, supra note 5, at 515.
See id.
See Raber, supra note 7, at 95.
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Just as some attributes of the CAS have both positive and
negative aspects in comparison with litigation, so too is the court in
some ways superior to litigation and in some ways inferior to
litigation in consideration of the same issue. Having experts on the
panel may bring efficiency gains as the need for expert witnesses
may be decreased and may also lead to a more accurate result.134
However, the more limited discovery procedures of the CAS, as
compared with litigation in United States courts cuts against the
possibility of reaching the most accurate and equitable result
possible.135
The CAS acts as a replacement to litigation. When the parties
agree that the efficiency benefits provided by binding arbitration
overrides any potential negative aspects of arbitration, these
negative qualities, including those related to due process
protections, are of less concern. Thus when the parties involved
are commercial entities, who have agreed to bring their dispute to
the CAS in the first instance, any due process concerns presented
in losing the right to a jury trial dissipate. However, in the case of
Olympic athletes, who are required to sign the Olympic binding
arbitration clause in order to compete, it is important to analyze the
due process deficiencies of the CAS.136
B. Negative Attributes of the Olympic Binding Arbitration
Clause—Due Process Concerns
In order for a proceeding to protect procedural due process
rights, one must be entitled to a hearing and notice of the hearing
time, date, and content.137 This hearing should be “in front of a
neutral decision-maker” and should provide “an opportunity to
make an oral presentation, to present favorable evidence and to

134

See id. at 94.
See id.; see also Naidoo & Sarin, supra note 5, at 515–16.
136
In the case of prospective Olympic athletes who are required to sign the Olympic
binding arbitration clause in order to compete, there are actually two issues. The first is
whether the provision should be struck for violating common law contractual doctrines.
Assuming arguendo that the provision will not be struck, one must then analyze the due
process protections provided by the CAS itself since it, in effect, is supplanting the right
to a trial.
137
See Naidoo & Sarin, supra note 5, at 497.
135
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confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.”138 Since the
Statutes of the CAS do not provide for the cross-examination of
adverse witnesses and fundamental rights of Olympic athletes to
engage in their employment are at stake, it could be argued that the
CAS fails to provide adequate procedural due process
protections.139 In Part III.C. I will discuss a current hearing, in
which the impartiality of an arbitrator was at issue, thereby
threatening the procedural due process rights of the athletes.
An additional issue touching on the neutrality of the CAS is its
funding. The CAS receives its funding from the ICAS. It remains
unclear, however, how the ICAS is funded.140 If ICAS funding can
be traced to the IOC, the World Anti-Doping Agency (“WADA”),
NOCs, or ISFs, the independence and impartiality of the CAS
would then be in question.
Substantive due process focuses on whether a rule or regulation
“is fair and reasonable and clearly relevant to the accomplishment
of its purpose.”141 Courts will review the rules of sports bodies
only in a limited number of situations. The courts will review the
rules of sports bodies when a rule violates public policy by being
fraudulent or unreasonable.142 They will also review when an
organization’s rules or regulations exceed the organization’s
authority, or when the organization violates one of its own rules.143
Finally, the courts will review when the rules in question are
applied unreasonably or arbitrarily, or violate an individual’s
constitutional rights.144
Perhaps the biggest reason for concern with the CAS is the
CAS Statute provision affording Swiss persons the right to appeal
CAS rulings in the absence of provisions stating that CAS
decisions will not be appealed by either of the parties.145 Since
non-Swiss persons do not have this right, and the IOC is
138

Id.
See generally Code of Sports-related Arbitration, supra note 114; see also Bitting,
supra note 14, at 664.
140
See Raber, supra note 7, at 89.
141
See Naidoo & Sarin, supra note 5, at 497.
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id. at 498.
145
See Code of Sports-related Arbitration, supra note 114, § 46, 59.
139
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incorporated in Switzerland, in any case involving the IOC and a
non-Swiss person, there is a very strong argument that the rule
violates public policy by being unreasonable.146 Moreover, if an
arbitration hearing violates fundamental notions of fairness, it
cannot be said that the proceeding provides substantive due
process. Because of the aforementioned CAS Statute, therefore,
the CAS arguably does not protect the substantive due process
rights of non-Swiss parties for hearings involving either the IOC,
or any other Swiss person or corporation.
The main due process concerns presented by the Olympic
binding arbitration agreement flow from the nature of the CAS. If
the CAS could provide the same procedural safeguards that other
courts of law provide, there would be less of a threat to the rights
of competitors. As Bitting notes, since the Olympic athlete can be
regarded as a professional, his rights should receive the same
protections as an employee who is compelled to accept binding
arbitration as a condition of employment.147 Even if the CAS is
able to alleviate these due process concerns, common law
contractual doctrines still may cause American courts to strike the
Olympic arbitration clause from contracts entered into by Olympic
competitors.148 Nonetheless, some recent cases shed light as to
competitor concerns about the CAS.
C. Potential Due Process Violations and the Court of Arbitration
for Sport
The recent case between the International Association of
Athletics Federation (“IAAF”) and Greek sprinters Kostas Kenteris
and Katerina Thanou is illustrative of the problems still plaguing
the CAS. The IAAF had suspended the sprinters from the Athens
Olympics for failure to appear at a drug test. Upon appeal, a Greek
146

It could also be argued that the CAS’s rulings are subject to review insofar as
affording a right to only one party in an arbitration amounts to unreasonable or arbitrary
application of the rules.
147
See Bitting, supra note 14, at 666–67.
148
See Naidoo & Sarin, supra note 5, at 503–05 (discussing whether the Olympic
binding arbitration clause may be voided by American courts because it violates common
law contractual doctrines); see also Bitting, supra note 14, at 667–77; see also PERILLO,
supra note 73, §§ 8.2, 9.2, 9.9, 9.38, 9.40 (discussing common law contractual
principles).
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Athletics Federation disciplinary panel reversed the suspension.149
The athletes appealed the selection of arbitrators because one of
the three arbitrators, Yves Fortier, worked for a law firm that
represented the WADA, thereby presenting a potential conflict of
interest.150 This episode may stand for the notion that the CAS
provides adequate avenues for potential conflicts of interest to be
remedied, as a new arbitration board is in the process of being
established to hear the case. However, it was not at the behest of
the CAS that the new board was established.151 Rather, Fortier
resigned from the arbitration panel so that the sprinters would feel
confident that the hearing was not tainted by a potential conflict of
interest.152
While it is unclear whether the CAS would have replaced
Fortier on its own accord, the court stated that it had confidence in
Fortier’s independence and impartiality.153 It is thus at least
questionable whether the CAS would have taken affirmative steps
to protect the organization from the hint of a conflict of interest.
The incident also illustrates that, though the CAS provides better
procedural due process protections than it did prior to the Paris
Agreement when the CAS was an arm of the IOC, these
protections are still not as strong as they need to be. While the due
process protections of the Greek sprinters were protected, in all
other cases that Fortier was an arbitrator, parties may not have had
sufficient procedural due process protections because the
impartiality and independence of arbitration panels that Fortier was
a member of is questionable.154 While the Greek sprinters case155
149
Sprint Duo Drop Drugs Ban Appeals, BBC SPORT, June 26, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport1/hi/athletics/5118074.stm [hereinafter “Sprint Duo”].
150
Martin King, Recent Decisions and Issues in the Court of Arbitration for Sport,
ARBITRATION WORLD, Summer 2006, at 4, 5.
151
Id. at 5–6.
152
Id. at 6.
153
Id.
154
See id. (noting that Tim Montgomery is appealing the verdict from his hearing before
the CAS because of Fortier’s failure to disclose his law firm’s relationship with the
World Anti-Doping Agency creating the possibility that the result achieved may not have
been an impartial one).
155
Sprint Duo, supra note 149. On the eve of the CAS hearing before a reconstituted
arbitration panel in June 2006, the IAAF and the sprinters settled the case, thus avoiding
a CAS ruling.
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provides an example of procedural due process rights being put in
jeopardy, the case of American skeleton team member Zachery
Lund provides an example of substantive due process rights
potentially not being protected by the CAS.
Lund was found to be in violation of the anti-doping rules for
using Proscar and Propecia to combat the effects of male pattern
baldness.156 The sole ingredient of these medicines is Finasteride,
which has been on the list of banned substances as a masking agent
since January 2005.157 Lund’s mistake in the case amounted to a
failure to thoroughly search the Federation Internationale de
Bobsleigh et Tobogganing (“FIBT”) website for a list of banned
substances. No party has alleged that Lund’s use of Finasteride
was with the intent of gaining an advantage over a competitor, nor
of concealing the use of performance enhancing substances.158
One who is trying to conceal the use of performance enhancing
substances would not list the use of a masking agent on a Drug
Control Form because the use of a masking agent is similarly
punishable by WADA.159 Rather, Lund had used these medicines
for years because they help stem the degree of his baldness.
Moreover, he has continuously listed his use of the medicines on
the Doping Control Form.160
Lund had participated in competitions in 2005 prior to the
November 2005 World Cup, in which he was ultimately found to
have committed a doping violation.161 He listed his use of antibaldness drugs at all competitions.162 Because of his honesty, the
fact that no one believed he was using the drugs to gain a
competitive advantage, and the perceived failure of the anti-doping
agencies to detect his violation sooner, the usually mandatory twoyear prohibition on competing was reduced to one year.163 Though
the CAS did not impose the ordinarily mandated two-year ban
156

See World Anti-Doping Agency v. Lund, Ct. of Arb. for Sport, CAS arbitration No.
CAS 06/001, at 5 (2006).
157
See id.
158
See id.
159
See generally id.
160
See id. at 9.
161
Cf. id.
162
Cf. id.
163
See id. at 9–10.
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from competition, there may still have been a substantive due
process violation in the case.
Should Lund elect to appeal the CAS ruling in a United States
court, he may prevail because the totality of the circumstances
indicates that the court’s application of the rules in question may
have been unreasonable or arbitrary. Had Lund’s violation been
detected earlier in the year, he would have been able to compete in
the Turin Olympics. As a result of the system’s failure and Lund’s
honest mistake, he missed his opportunity to compete.
III. IMPROVING THE COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT
A main difference between the Olympic binding arbitration
requirement and the Amateur Sports Act provision that requires
binding arbitration is that the Olympic provision pertains to all
disputes brought by competitors.164 The Amateur Sports Act
provision, on the other hand, only pertains to disputes arising
within twenty-one days of the beginning of an international
competition.165 For this reason, the due process concerns created
by the structure and operation of the CAS are greater than those
presented by the Amateur Sports Act.
Going forward, the CAS will likely play an ever-increasing
role in resolution of sports law disputes. It is thus imperative that
the CAS ameliorate the areas in which its due process protections
are not sufficient. There are many fairly simple steps the ICAS
can take to cure sources of due process concerns with the CAS.166
Publishing CAS decisions, allowing for greater discovery,
including the cross-examination of adverse witnesses, providing
athletes with more information regarding rights and resources
available to them, and ensuring that the arbitrator lists include
people from diverse backgrounds will all help increase athlete
confidence in the court.167 I will now address a few of the issues
raised in this paper.

164
165
166
167

See Bitting, supra note 14, at 663.
See Amateur Sports Act, 36 U.S.C. § 220509 (2006).
See Naidoo & Sarin, supra note 5, at 515; see also Raber, supra note 7, at 96–97.
See Naidoo & Sarin, supra note 5, at 515; see also Raber, supra note 7, at 96–97.
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For disciplinary matters that arise after the completion of a
competition, I do not believe there is a sufficient reason to require
that athletes agree to binding arbitration. Binding arbitration
during the Olympic Games is mainly defensible because of how
quickly a decision can be reached in comparison with lengthy
trials, thereby allowing competitions to be held in a timely manner.
But if the infraction is detected subsequent to competition, this
interest is no longer as paramount, and then the athlete’s interest in
protecting his due process rights should trump the desire for a swift
verdict.
Also, the decision to have binding arbitration before the CAS is
one better achieved through mutual consensus. So, when this
mutual consensus is not present, the international sports law
system should protect athlete rights, since it is their livelihood that
is often at stake. On the other hand, when parties negotiate for
binding arbitration from positions of equal footing, there is no
reason not to prohibit appeal from CAS rulings. Moreover, it is
unlikely that national judicial systems will assert jurisdiction in
most cases because of the general belief that sports are better left
outside of the courtroom.
Indeed, arbitration before the CAS could still be required, but
with a provision allowing for a full trial should certain triggering
conditions be met. Thus, even if the only thing the IOC requires is
that parties consent to arbitration prior to engaging in litigation,
this may be sufficient to keep most cases out of national court
systems. Leaving the litigation avenue open to prospective
Olympic athletes will also make athletes more confident in the
fairness of CAS proceedings since they will know that they can
appeal if they find the procedural safeguards of the court lacking.
If athletes are more confident in the fairness of CAS proceedings,
they will probably pursue more matters in the CAS, even when not
required to do so.
A second main issue the CAS should address is its source of
funding. The court’s independence has been questioned because
the IOC previously funded the court and it is not currently known
how the CAS is funded. While the ICAS was created to ensure the
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financial independence of the CAS,168 if the ICAS is funded by the
IOC, this extra layer of bureaucracy could merely be masking a
continued IOC role in funding the CAS. Clarifying the court’s
sources of funding would put practitioners and athletes at ease that
the court is sufficiently financially independent. A possible source
of funding for the CAS could be from raising the fees it charges.
A second potential source could be the NOCs, who in general side
with the athletes in disciplinary matters. If the source of the
funding is the committees that want their athletes to be able to
compete, potential competitors will be less concerned about the
financial independence of the CAS.
Next, the flaw in the CAS statutes allowing for appeal of CAS
rulings by Swiss citizens or those having a “domicile, habitual
residence, or business establishment in Switzerland” when there is
not an express provision preventing such a right of appeal should
be closed.169 If the CAS really wishes to attain the esteem of the
entire sports and legal community, different rules should not be
applied to Swiss citizens or those with substantial connections to
Switzerland, as compared with those lacking such a relationship
with Switzerland.
Finally, when the neutrality of CAS arbitrators is questionable,
the CAS should be willing to reopen such cases or assign new
arbitration panels as appropriate. The episode involving the Greek
sprinters makes clear that no judicial body is perfect. The CAS
could have served its interest in promoting confidence in the
impartiality of arbitration boards much better had it requested Mr.
Fortier to resign and allowed the reopening of the Montgomery
case before a different arbitration panel.

168

See Naidoo & Sarin, supra note 5, at 502; see also Reeb, supra note 96.
See Code of Sports-related Arbitration, supra note 114, §§ 46, 59 (noting that awards
“may not be challenged by way of an action for setting aside to the extent that the parties
have no domicile, habitual residence, or business establishment in Switzerland.”).
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